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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES
B.R. SKELTONt
Despite the 1935 National Labor Relations Act's ban on employer
unfair laborpractices, businesses continue tofight unionization with ille-
gal tactics. In this Article, Professor Skeltonprovides an economic ra-
tionale for the behavior of businesses confronted with union
organizational efforts. Professor Skelton suggests thatfirms will choose
the least costly economic option to avoid unions even !f the option is
illegal He contends that the insignffcant sanctions imposed by the Act
encourage rather than discourage the use of unfair laborpractices and
argues that the Act should be amended to provideforpunitive sanctions,
svecYcally, a system offfmes. Such a change would increase the costs of
violating the Act and would thus make the use of illegal means tofight a
union economically unattractive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Business firms generally prefer to maintain unorganized labor forces
rather than those represented by unions. This attitude has led to frequent con-
frontations between business and unions that, prior to the passage of laws im-
plementing collective bargaining as national policy, usually evolved into
power struggles between the two groups. Unions fought for recognition
through strikes, pickets, boycotts, and other concerted activities. Employers,
on the other hand, countered with strike-breakers, company unions, court in-
junctions, and adverse personnel actions, usually with overwhelming success.
In response to this struggle between management and unions, Congress in
1935 enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' The purpose of the
Act was two-fold: to establish guaranteed collective bargaining rights for em-
ployees working in interstate commerce and to restrict employer unfair labor
practices. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created to ad-
minister the Act and was authorized to settle questions of representation, pro-
cess unfair labor practice complaints and establish appropriate remedies' for
unfair labor practice violations.
Despite the passage of the NLRA, however, employer opposition to un-
ions has not subsided, and some firms continue to fight union organization
with both legal and illegal tactics. Principal preelection unfair labor practices
include interference with the election process, restraint or coercion of workers
who seek to organize and bargain collectively, and adverse personnel actions
t Professor of Economics, Clemson University.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
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against workers who engage in union activities, the latter two practices being
section 8(a)(3) violations.2 The employer's choice between legal and illegal
means of opposing unions usually depends upon its estimate of the relative
benefits and costs of each. Therefore, given a limited budget with which to
avoid an election, or to persuade workers to vote against a union, a firm may
choose to employ both legal and illegal tactics.
Cost-Bentl t Analysis3
In their efforts to realize profits, all business firms seek to combine re-
sources used in production so that basic costs will be minimized. This requires
that all resources be utilized such that the marginal benefit of the resource is
equal to its marginal cost. In theory, profits will be maximized once this is
achieved.
Most employers feel that unions make the achievement of this profit max-
inizing goal more difficult because they impose added costs on the firms.
These costs can be direct economic expenditures in the form of wages and
fringe benefits, or they can be indirect costs, such as employer rights, or "lan-
guage items,' '4 that erode managerial decision-making authority. Thus, faced
with the possibility of union organization, and having determined the approxi-
mate added costs to the firm, the decision-makers within the firm must decide
whether it would be economically advantageous to oppose the union. This
essentially becomes a cost-benefit decision since a firm may incur added costs
as well as realize potential benefits from opposition to the union.
Theoretically, the firm is willing to spend the additional money (cost) that
it determines will be saved (benefit) should the union be avoided. This
amount becomes the budget constraint for the firm, which then must decide
how to distribute the money in the fight against the union. Obviously, numer-
ous legal and illegal means are available. They range in scope from attempts
to persuade employees to vote for the company in the event of an election, to
the dismissal of union activists, or in some cases, to the closing of the plant
itself.
2. Id. § 158(a)(3)(1976). Evidence of the increasing number of employer unfair labor prac-
tice violations can be found in the statistics reported in the NLRB Annual Reports.
3. Cost-benefit analysis is a basic tool of economics. For applications of cost-benefit
analysis to case studies from the Council on Wage and Price Stability see J. MILLER III & B.
YANDLE, Benet-Cost Analyses of Social Regulations (American Enterprise Institute 1979). For
application to motor vehicle offenses and tax evasion see Tullock, An Economic Approach to
Crime, 50 Soc. Sci. Q. (June 1969); see also G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971). For an
application of these principles to the problem of political "dirty tricks," see McKenzie & Yandle,
The Logic of "Irrational" Politics. Nixon's Reelection Committee, 8 Pub. Finance Q. 39 (January
1980). For a more general treatment of the economics of crime, see Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 69 (March/April 1968); Firey, Limits to Economy in
Crime and Punishment, 50 Soc. SC. Q. 72 (June 1969).
Cost-benefit analysis is applicable to many employer and union decisions other than those
discussed in this Article. Among these are additional unfair labor practices committed by both
employers and unions, intentional violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
Environmental Protection Act, and violations of wage and price guidelines. Even employer
opposition to and union encouragement of labor law reform are subject to cost-benefit analysis.
4. See part II infra.
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Each of these options involve costs, benefits, and varying risks of success
or failure. Within a given budget constraint, expenditures earmarked for
fighting the union will be allocated so that the last dollar spent for each alter-
native will equal the benefit received from the particular expenditure.5 De-
pending upon the employer's estimate of costs and benefits, it is likely that
both legal and illegal alternatives will be considered. Because unfair labor
practices do in fact occur, it can be inferred that an employer often estimates
the costs of illegal activities to be low relative to the benefits of such activities,
or that the estimated probability of success is greater when unfair labor prac-
tices are instituted.
II. MARGINAL BENEFIT
The benefit derived by a company in avoiding a union is best illustrated
by analyzing the potential effect the union can have on the firm. When a
union is certified by the NLRB as a bargaining representative, management is
required by the NLRA to engage in good faith bargaining in an effort to reach
contractual agreement. Clauses agreed upon and included in a contract as a
result of such bargaining generally represent items over which management
previously exercised unilateral control, except for those previously dictated by
governmental rules and regulations. These clauses can be categorized into two
general groups: economic items and language items.
Economic items represent direct monetary outlays for wages and fringe
benefits. They are subject to quantification, but only to the extent of estimates
ex ante, since neither the company nor the union knows the range of actual
costs until a final agreement is reached. Language items, on the other hand,
do not necessarily involve direct monetary outlays, although their application
could result in expenditures at a later date. Language items include provisions
pertaining to seniority, just cause for discipline and discharge, and grievance
procedures. While these clauses may not initiate direct monetary outlays, they
do represent encroachment on managerial prerogatives, some of which are
held dear.
The marginal benefit a firm derives by avoiding a union is the sum of
these additional costs plus the costs of potential concerted activities, such as
strikes, pickets, and boycotts. In this particular context, therefore, the word
"benefit" refers to "cost saving," since such potential expenses would revert to
benefits if the firm avoids the union.
5. In other words, the allocation of expenditures between possibilities will be such that:
MBa MBb MBc MBi  $1
MCa MCb - MC, MC = $1
where
MB = marginal benefit of the option
MC = marginal cost of the option
a, b, c --- i = options available to fight unions
1980]
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III. MARGINAL COSTS
The actual cost incurred by a firm in opposing a union is dependent upon
its choice between legal and illegal actions. Legal options involve relatively
few costs, namely attorneys fees and management time diverted to the cam-
paign. Illegal options, on the other hand, usually entail greater costs but may
result in potentially greater benefits to the firm. The typical costs incurred by
a firm engaging in unlawful efforts to avoid a union are the sanctions imposed
by the NLRB. These costs, over and above the firm's legal fees, serve as reme-
dies for unfair labor practice violations. The typical remedy, however, is rela-
tively costless to the firm, a fact that tends to encourage rather than discourage
illegal activity.
6
Employers generally commit two types of unfair labor practices with re-
gard to union organizational efforts: interference with workers' organizational
rights, and discriminatory personnel actions based on a worker's union activ-
ity, section 8 (a) 3 violations.7 These unfair labor practices can affect when
and if an election will be held as well as determine its actual outcome. When
workers are threatened with the loss of their jobs, or in fact lose their jobs due
to union-related activities, it becomes clear to them that the employer has no
intention of allowing a union to represent the employees. These wrongful ac-
tivities serve to prevent workers from expressing their true feelings, and
thereby discourage them from signing the necessary union authorization cards.
In some cases, the violations of the NLRA serve to erode an already existing
union majority and hinder the election process, usually resulting in the defeat
of the union if the election is held.8
In order to restrain employers from committing unfair labor practices, the
courts have ruled that remedies must be appropriate for the violations in-
volved and cannot be punitive. For example, the typical remedy for a section
8 (a) 1 violation is a cease and desist order, which may be accompanied by a
required posting of notices detailing the violations and, in certain instances,
the reading of the notices to assembled employees. 9 On the other hand, the
usual remedy for a section 8(a)(3) violation, discriminatory discharge, is sim-
ply reinstatement of the worker with back pay.10
The initial cost to the firm of a cease and desist order is minimal, prima-
rily because it requires little direct monetary outlay other than for legal fees
and management expenses. While continued violations of these orders over a
period of time could result in contempt of court citations and possibly fines,
6. See text accompanying note 12 infra.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
8. See Getman, Goldberg & Herman, The NLRB Voting Study: A Preliminary Report, 1 J.
LEGAL STuD., 233-58 (1972) (concluding that campaigns by employers and unions have little ef-
fect on the outcome of elections). Whether conclusions on campaigns can be generalized to em-
ployer unfair labor practices is uncertain.
9. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 105 (1967).
10. See, eg., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Local 57, Ladies Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
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courts have not been inclined to take this type of action. The direct monetary
outlay for discriminatory discharge, on the other hand, can be significant, but
compared to the potential benefit to the firm, this tactic actually may prove to
be relatively inexpensive if the discharge decreases the risk of successful
unionization. 1 In fact, these remedies impose little cost on the employer rela-
tive to the potential benefits that may accrue as a result of the violations.
Firms derive from this statutory impotence added incentive to commit unfair
labor practices in their opposition to unions. 12
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The substantial number of unfair labor practice allegations filed annually
offers proof that the potential benefits gained by employers who use illegal
means to keep unions out exceed the anticipated costs of their actions. This
revelation reinforces the premise that remedies available to the NLRB for sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices do little to deter future
violations.
The NLRA encourages rather than discourages labor law violations be-
cause its sanctions were created on the assumption that 100 percent of all vio-
lators will be charged, found guilty, and forced to make restitution to the party
bringing the charges. However, there is always the chance in any case that
charges will not be filed against the firm, or that if found guilty it will not have
to "make whole" the charging party. Thus, because the guilty party may not
have to pay for his wrongdoing for one reason or another, there exists eco-
nomic incentive to violate the law.
An analogy may serve to clarify this position. Suppose the only remedy
the courts can legally impose for bank robbery is to require the thief to repay
the bank the money he has stolen. Suppose further that there is some fixed
probability, say fifty percent, that the thief will be apprehended, convicted, or
forced to repay. The likelihood, therefore, that the robber eventually will have
to reimburse the bank is a multiplicative function of apprehension, conviction,
and reimbursement, or .5x.5x.5 = .125. This means that there is one chance in
eight that the robber will have to return the money to the bank. Under such
conditions bank robbery could very well prove to be a worthwhile endeavor.
This same rationale applies to unfair labor practice violations. The basic
shortcoming of the NLRA is that it was not designed to deter violations but
11. Costs of this type are readily quantifiable, although it may prove difficult ex ante to
determine the length of time for which back pay is to be awarded or to ascertain other adjustments
that the NLRB will make in the award.
12. When the NLRA was enacted in 1935, Congress apparently believed that the law would
deter labor-related violations. This, however, has not been the case. The number of charges filed
for § 8(a)(l) and § 8(a)(3) violations more than doubled during the 10 year period 1969-78; fur-
ther, charges for these same violations per election held nearly doubled during the same interval.
See 34 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. (1969) through 43 NLRB ANN. REP. (1978) Tables I and 2. This
increase can be attributed in part to the labor force's improved knowledge of the protection af-
forded by the NLRA, and in part to the expanded efforts by less easily organized firms to avoid
unions. It is likely that intentional violations will continue, since the nature of the available reme-
dies serves to encourage rather than discourage them.
1980]
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merely to remedy situations in which violations have already occurred. When
a law is not punitive and imposes only "make whole" remedies, it is reason-
able to expect it to be violated, especially when there exists a substantial
probability that the violator will not even have to "make whole" the offended
party.1 3 This reduces the cost of labor law violations to businesses and there-
fore encourages them to resort to illegal tactics in fighting unions.
In order to deter unfair labor practices, Congress must revise the NLRA
so as to either reduce the benefits that employers derive from illegal activities
or increase the projected costs of fighting the unions. It appears, however, that
little can be done to reduce the firm's marginal benefit from opposing unioni-
zation other than to increase the probability that the union will win an election
or be certified as a bargaining representative. It is true that the NLRB has
fashioned a remedy that reduces the probability of a successful anti-union
fight by issuing bargaining orders based on preelection unfair labor practices.
Under the Gissel 4 doctrine, bargaining orders can be issued even though the
union loses an election !f significant unfair labor practices are found to have
eroded a previously existing union majority.15 Expanding this concept to situ-
ations in which fair elections are impossible might in turn decrease the benefit
to the firm and therefore could result in a decrease of unfair labor practice
violations.
A more effective restraint on unfair labor practices, however, would be
amending the NLRA to increase the cost of violating its provisions. Any
change in statute, the NLRB, or court procedures that increases the likelihood
that a violator will be found guilty will of course increase the cost of viola-
tions. In addition, changes that affect the monetary aspect of the remedy by
converting its "make whole" provisions to punitive ones will produce similar
effects on costs.
Of the choices available that increase the costs of engaging in unfair labor
practices, a system of punitive sanctions appears to be the most feasible.
16
Theoretically, such a system would increase the firm's marginal costs, bring
about a drastic reduction in the firm's unfair labor practices, 17 and force the
firm to revert to legal means in fighting the union. Overall, a system of fines
would produce the desired results and impose few significant costs on society
in general.
18
13. Any probability less than 100% that the violator will have to "make whole" the offended
party reduces the marginal cost of such violations. See Becker, supra note 3; Tullock, supra note
3.
14. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
15. Id. at 610-16. For a discussion of this ruling and its effect see S. Brown, The Effectiveness
of the Remedies Used in Protecting and Promoting the Employee's Right to Organize (May 1972)
(unpublished L.L.M. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
16. Brown concludes that Congress should not impose sanctions until the Board fully uses
the powers it has under the Act. See S. Brown, supra note 15, at 190-92.
17. Becker considers increases in the likelihood of punishment and harsher penalties as de-
terrents to crime becaues they increase the cost of violations. See Becker, supra note 3, at 177.
18. In the event that a fine system is implemented, a method would still have to be devised to
distinguish accidental violations from intentional ones. The NLRB and the courts could use the




Although the National Labor Relations Act was designed to deter em-
ployer unfair labor practices, statistics indicate that the Act has failed to
achieve this goal and, in fact, may have had the effect of encouraging the use
of illegal tactics. Why do intentional violations of the Act occur? In short,
given the Act's lack of meaningful sanctions, the benefits realized by a firm
engaging in unfair labor practices equal or exceed the costs of engaging in
those practices. As a result, law violations are frequently the least cost eco-
nomic alternative.
Also, the use of discretion in determining the amount of fines would permit first offenders to be
treated accordingly, while progressively costlier fines could be levied for repeat offenders.
1980]

